This paper presents a model of a poverty trap that is caused by an unequal initial income and human capital distribution, and differences in the quality of education between children from the more and less advantaged social sectors. Under certain conditions, the economy converges to a situation with three stable and simultaneous equilibria, two of which constitute poverty traps, lowering the economy's current and steady-state aggregate output level as well as its growth rate. The model suggests that a policy oriented to equalizing the quality of education would, in the long run, have potential in reducing initial inequalities.
Introduction
This paper presents a poverty trap model caused by an unequal income and human capital distribution and by the segmentation of social sectors, expressed by differences in the quality of education received by children from the more and less advantaged socioeconomic sectors. The model is based on Berti Ceroni (2001) , with the important difference that this approach incorporates the quality of education.
The question driving this paper is whether the intergenerational transmission of poverty can actually be broken down through education. It is argued that even if poor children receive an education, if it is not of good quality, the cognitive skills they acquire will not suffice for obtaining an income that allows them to leave poverty. 1 The policy implications derived from the model are related to Roemer's (1998) theory of equality of opportunity according to which unequal results cannot be justified if they are due to differences in circumstances rather than differences in efforts. This is also in line with the 2006 World Development Report: 'the equalizing promise of education can be realised only if children from different backgrounds have equal opportunities to benefit from quality education' (World Bank 2005: 140) .
The case of Argentina motivates this paper. The country has experienced a significant increase in poverty and inequality since the 1970s (CEDLAS 2004, among others) . At the same time, and contrary to what had occurred previously, the educational system presents some signs of segmentation. The results of the year 2000 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to test 15 year-old students, suggest that from all participating countries, Argentina is one with the highest test score gap between the lowest and the highest 20 per cent of the family wealth index. It is also among the countries in which the betweenschools variation in students' performance accounts for a larger part of overall variation, and seems to be associated with differences in students' socioeconomic backgrounds (OECD 2003) . Using other data sources, Llach and Schumacher (2004) and Cervini (2002 Cervini ( , 2005 also argue that the educational system is segmented between the more and less advantaged social sectors. Such segmentation may have serious consequences in terms of the persistence of poverty in the long term.
Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on poverty traps. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 derives the policy implications. Section 5 presents some basic empirical evidence supporting the assumption of segmentation and finally, Section 6 concludes.
Poverty Trap Models in the Literature
A poverty trap is any reinforcing mechanism that causes poverty to persist (Azariadis and Stachurski 2005: 33) . From the beginning of the development theory, this concept has been useful in explaining the observed differences in per capita income between countries. Poverty trap models are associated with some type of departure from the neoclassical assumptions such as non-convexities (scale economies, positive externalities, and other increasing returns), the existence of imperfect competition, some market failures (especially capital markets), and acknowledgement of the importance of institutional frameworks. These
The concept of poverty traps can also be applied to explain situations of economic duality, in which a fraction of the population reaches a good equilibrium, with a high income level, while another fraction remains trapped in a bad equilibrium, with a low-income level. This is labelled fractal poverty traps by Easterly (2001) and Barrett and Swallow (2003) .
The papers of Galor and Zeira (1993) , Galor and Tsiddon (1997) , and Berti Ceroni (2001) correspond to this concept of poverty traps. In Galor and Zeira's (1993) model the poverty trap is driven by credit market imperfections, with a borrower's interest rate increasing with lenders' monitoring costs, which are in turn increasing in the amount lent. In this way, the initial distribution of wealth determines each dynasty's human capital accumulation path and steady state. The economy becomes segmented in two groups: the skilled and wealthy workers -for whom investing in education is an optimal decision -and the unskilled and unwealthy workers -who derive a higher utility from non-investing in education. Matsuyama (2000) has a similar model with the difference that the threshold that divides the rich and the poor is endogenously determined. Galor and Tsiddon's (1997) model presents two types of positive externalities: a home environment externality, according to which an individual's level of human capital is an increasing function of the parental level of human capital, and a global technological externality, according to which technological progress is positively related to the average level of human capital in society. In the first phase of development, the home environment externality is the dominating factor, creating strong inequalities in human capital distribution. However, as investment in human capital of the highly educated segments of society increases, the global technological externality starts to dominate, leading to an income convergence. The model suggests that equality-enhancing policies implemented prematurely may lead to a low output trap.
Berti Ceroni (2001) criticizes Galor and Zeira's (1993) assumption of credit market restrictions to financing investment in education, arguing that credit market imperfections are more likely to take the extreme form of self-financing constraints, since expected human capital is not generally accepted as collateral. At the same time she criticizes Galor and Tsiddon (1997) , remarking that empirical evidence on the existence of non-convexities in individual human capital accumulation is far from conclusive. The author presents a model in which a fraction of the population remains trapped in a low level of human capital and income, and another fraction is able to reach equilibrium at a high level of human capital and income. Education is privately financed: parents decide (motivated by altruism) to invest their disposable income in educating their children. The poverty trap is generated by non-homothetic preferences so that the poor require higher returns to education than the rich in order to invest in education.
2 For a recent thorough revision of the literature on poverty traps, see Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) . The model developed in this paper is based on Berti Ceroni (2001) . The main difference is that here the quality of education is incorporated as a key element in addition to the segmentation of the economy in social sectors or networks given by education. 3 Instead of reaching a situation with two stable equilibria (one good and one bad), the economy converges to a situation with three stable equilibria, two bad and one good. Similarities and differences with Berti Ceroni (2001) are pointed out in the presentation of the model in Section 3.
The Model
This is based on Berti Ceroni (2001) in being a model of overlapping generations. Each family is composed of two individuals, father and son. Each individual is born with the same ability, lives two periods and is endowed with one unit of time in each period. Individuals can make decisions only in the second period of their lives. When young, individuals receive an education if their parents so decide, in which case they assign their unit of time to school. Children who do not go to school acquire a fixed level of human capital as a consequence of the passage of time. In the second period of their lives all individuals offer their time unit on the labour market, earn an income proportional to their level of human capital, and decide how to allocate it between consumption and spending on their children's education. 4 Following Berti Ceroni (2001) , the utility function of parent i in time t depends on consumption in period t and on the stock of human capital of the ith child in period 1 + t . It takes the form:
where δ is a parameter that measures the altruistic motive, with 0 1 δ ≤ ≤ . The human capital production function presents the first departure from Berti Ceroni's model. It is assumed that there is segmentation in the economy between the families of the more educated parents and families of less educated parents. Such segmentation is usually observed, especially in developing countries. It can be seen in terms of social circles or networks, or even neighbourhoods. Superscript j denotes the social circle. v v ≤ ; j a represents the socioeconomic environment in which the family lives. It is plausible to assume that when children grow up in better educated social networks, they enjoy positive externalities. The exchange with educated adults and children (peer-effect) whose parents have high education reinforces the knowledge and skills they learn at home and at school. Formally, this parameter moves upwards the whole human capital production function. As before, it is assumed that for
Education here is considered to be public; this is the second difference with Berti Ceroni's model. However, there exists a private cost of education ij t e , given by the cost of complementary goods such as books and transportation to school, and by the opportunity cost of non-working. This cost is assumed to be independent of the parent's level of education. However, j b is a parameter that depends on the social circle to which the child belongs. It is the education spending threshold level that is necessary so that the child's human capital starts to increase. In other words, it is the spending level at which spending in education starts to be effective. As before, for
A simple example might help to understand this assumption. It is very common that children whose parents are highly educated start first grade of primary school already knowing to read and write and performing some simple mathematical operations. This, on the other hand, is very rare among children whose parents have a low level of education. Therefore, the minimum level of education (and so the minimum educational spending) needed by the children of the better educated parents in order to exhibit an improvement in their skills is higher than the minimum required by children of the less educated parents.
Finally, j q represents the quality of education received by the child belonging to social sector j, which is of particular interest in the model. The quality of education that the child receives is not a decision variable for the parents, which is determined by the allocation of public resources to each school. It is assumed -in principle -that schools with students coming from better educated families have a better quality of education than schools with students coming from less educated families, that is, for
≤ . This is a key assumption and its empirical validity will be explored in Section 5. . Sector 2 j = parent's human capital level is higher than sector 1 j = parent's human capital level (
). 5 It can be noted that for both social sectors, when education spending is lower than the minimum required for it to be effective ( μ correspondingly, which is higher in the case of children of parents with higher education. As soon as education spending exceeds the threshold, children's human capital level starts to increase, and it does so at a decreasing rate. This diminishing returns behaviour is a natural way of thinking of human capital accumulation, reflecting the limits imposed by the capacity of any human being, which restricts the conversion of increasing education spending in ever-increasing cognitive skills.
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The figure clearly indicates the effect of segmentation and initial disadvantages. Children of the less educated parents have a lower education level at home, which results in a lower education spending threshold. At the same time, they benefit from lower external effects generated by the interaction with other people within their social circle, and they attend schools of lower quality education.
As in Berti Ceroni's model, the economy produces a final good only through a linear technology that uses human capital as the only production factor:
where t H is the aggregate stock of human capital in period t and ) ( Children education spending (e(t)) h(t+1), j=1 h(t+1), j=2
The Solution to the Microeconomic Problem
The individual maximization programme that parent i has to solve in time t is given by: Following Behrman and Birdsall (1983) , it is assumed that the quality of education is determined by public resource allocation to schooling out of general overall revenues so there is no direct relation 6 between the quality in a particular area and the tax burden of a particular household located in that area. Therefore the budget constraint does not consider taxes.
As in Berti Ceroni's model, the utility function is non-homothetic. The marginal rate of substitution between the parent's consumption in period t and the child's human capital for a given ratio between the two is decreasing in the parent's human capital stock, so that the poor require relatively higher returns from education to start investing.
Replacing the budget constraint and the human capital production function in the utility function and maximizing with respect to ij t e , the expression of optimal spending in education is obtained:
Note that for human capital levels equal to or lower than the threshold j h , education spending is constant at the minimum required level of spending ( j b ). For human capital levels above the threshold j h , the proportion of income assigned to education increases with the educational level of the parent.
As expression (6) shows, the parent's human capital threshold level j h , at which education spending starts to increase, is increasing in i's human capital is obtained:
Under the mentioned assumptions regarding the parameters, the dynamics of human capital accumulation of each dynasty is independent of the aggregate dynamic, but is dependent on the social circle j to which the dynasty belongs. This transition function ( )
has a positive slope and is concave
Conditions for the Emergence of Multiple Equilibria
It is assumed that the current income distribution determines the future one:
Given the initial human capital distribution and the individual transition equation, it is possible to analyse the behaviour of income distribution over time. The emergence of poverty traps requires the individual transition function to exhibit multiple steady states. In what follows, the conditions under which three stable equilibria emerge are analysed. One of these equilibria is such that dynasties that start with low levels of human capital and income remain uneducated; the second one is such that dynasties that also start with low levels of human capital and income (although higher than the levels of the previous ones), invest in education but as they receive low-quality education, they get trapped in an 'intermediate' level of human capital and income, and can never reach the good third equilibrium to which only the dynasties that start with a high level of human capital and income converge. 6 It is assumed that there are only two sectors or social circles with initial human capital levels clearly differentiated: 1, 2 j = , with 
C.2) Analogously, it is understood that the human capital level of a child that does not receive formal education is non-negative, so that:
3) At the same time, as it was explained in Section 3.1, it is assumed that:
C.4) It is also assumed that the human capital threshold at which the spending function starts to increase in the parent's human capital is higher for the dynasties with a higher initial education level. This is consistent with the assumption that the threshold at which education spending starts to be effective is higher for the children with more educated parents than for the children with less educated parents (
Formally, the condition is:
Replacing (6) in both sides of the inequality and re-arranging, the condition is re-expressed as:
C.5) It is required that for each j, the human capital threshold at which the education spending function starts to increase in the parent's human capital level is higher than the child's human capital level if he does not receive education:
This condition guarantees that the human capital accumulation curve for each j intersects the 45° line, so that corner solutions appear at low income levels, constituting a stable equilibrium: once the dynasty reaches the human capital level j μ , it remains there forever. Replacing (6) at the left of the inequality and re-arranging, the condition can be re-expressed as:
For the existence of other equilibria at higher income levels and for the emergence of poverty traps, it is required that the derivative of each transition function j in its concave part (when j ij t h h > ), has a slope greater than 1 when it is evaluated at the point where
. This point will be called j u h . Formally, it is required that:
To find an expression of this condition in terms of the parameters, it is necessary to find first an expression for j u h , for which the transition equation (7) needs to be solved, evaluated at the point in
For simplicity, the following notation will be used:
Applying the exponential to both sides of equation (9), it can be re-written as:
Multiplying both sides of equation (10) by
and re-arranging the terms, equation (11) is obtained:
Using the W Lambert Function (cited in Euler 1783), the solution to equation (11) is given by: 7
7 In general terms, given an expression X Y Xe = , the W function (also called Product Log) provides a solution to it given by:
The W Lambert function can be expanded in series: Replacing expression (12) in the condition for the existence of multiple equilibria, which requires that in j u h the transition function has a slope higher than 1, the condition can be stated as:
For condition (13) to be satisfied, it must hold that: 
Equilibria at the Aggregate Level: The Poverty Traps
While each of the two j-transition functions presents three equilibria, the equilibria that prevail at the aggregate level depend on the interval of human capital levels in which each human capital accumulation function h + operates. In other words, the number and type of equilibria that are determined in the economy depend on the human capital level that distinguishes the two social circles: the more and the less educated. This threshold will be called ĥ . As an example, ĥ could correspond to tertiary (university or other post-secondary) education.
To define this level, two additional conditions will be defined, which allow the configuration of equilibria of interest in this paper. In the first place, it is assumed that:
This condition requires the human capital level achieved by the children of the more educated parents when they do not receive formal education ( 2 2 i t e b < ) to be lower than the human capital level achieved by the children of the less educated parents when they receive formal education ( Second, it is required that:
The first part of this condition requires the human capital level that works as a threshold in sector 2 = j below which dynasties end up being non-educated, to be lower than the maximum human capital level that dynasties from sector 1 = j can achieve. Although this sounds arbitrary, it may be argued that the opposite case would be extreme in the assumptions regarding social segmentation. The second part of this condition requires the human capital level that distinguishes the two sectors ( ĥ ) to be higher than the human capital level to which the initially less educated dynasties that invest in education converge ( * L h ). Again, although it seems an arbitrary condition, together with the previous ones it guarantees an intuitive result: that at least some of the poor decide to invest in education. Considering all the mentioned conditions, the aggregate transition function is obtained. For parents' human capital levels lower than the threshold (t h h < ), the human capital accumulation function that prevails is the one corresponding to 1 j = ; for parents' human capital levels above the threshold (t h h ≥ ), the prevailing human capital accumulation is the one that corresponds to 2 j = . The expression for this aggregate function is given by: The figure shows that the aggregate transition function has a discontinuity at the threshold level ĥ , and that three stable equilibria are defined at levels 
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The second equilibrium * L h corresponds to the poor. Dynasties that converge to this equilibrium are those whose initial human capital is above 1 u h but below ĥ . 10 The parents of these dynasties invest enough in their children's education (
. However, given that they move in a low-educated social circle and receive low-quality education, the human capital level to which they eventually converge is considerably lower than the one corresponding to the third possible equilibrium * H h . This one corresponds to the non-poor, and is reached only by those dynasties with an initial human capital above ĥ , not only because of their favourable initial conditions, but also because they receive high-quality education.
The two poverty traps constituted by equilibriums 1 μ and * L h can be seen not only in relative terms but also in absolute terms if one thinks of two poverty lines, one for extreme poverty -z 1 -and one for poverty -z 2 -such that
Income Distribution and Macroeconomic Equilibrium
Once the three long-run equilibria to which different fractions of the society converge are identified, it is possible to obtain the aggregate level of education spending, each period t output and the long-run output.
As in Berti Ceroni (2001) , at any point in time, income distribution determines current aggregate investment in education and aggregate human capital and income of the next period. Given the human
, and , the aggregate education spending E t is given by:
Considering expressions (3) and (15), the aggregate output is given by: 10 It is worth noting that there are dynasties that despite the fact that they start with a human capital level higher than The negative effect of inequality in the initial human capital distribution on aggregate output persists in the long run because of the existence of poverty traps. The steady-state aggregate output is given by:
where one can see that the highest potential output level 
Economic Policy Implications
Among the set of parameters , , , , v b a refer to intrinsic characteristics of the two social sectors, the more and the less educated, while parameter δ measures the degree of altruism of parents to children and is common to both social sectors. None of these can be influenced by public policy.
A natural question that arises in this setting is what would be the effect of a policy that guaranteed the same quality of education to all children, independent of the social sector from which they come. Figure  3 depicts the effect of equating the quality of education in the two sectors ( h , independent of whether their human capital was below or above ĥ , that is, independent of whether they belong to the more or the less educated sector. 13 A fraction of the population still remains uneducated, with the human capital level This policy exercise exemplifies the crucial role that the quality of education can play in the economy. If -despite being public -the education received by a child from an advantaged social circle is higher than that received by a child from a disadvantaged one, social inequalities will be perpetuated causing poverty traps. Even when the years of schooling are the same for these two children, the acquired cognitive skills (i.e., acquired human capital) will not be, affecting their future employability in the labour market, and therefore, their future incomes.
The model shows in a very schematic way, that even with marked initial disadvantages represented by lower values of parameters j v , j a and j b , if children from the disadvantaged sectors receive the same quality of education as the children from the advantaged sectors, this can eliminate the initial inequalities in the long run (at least in part).
Evidence of Segmentation for an Argentinean Sample
This section provides some empirical intuition regarding one of the key assumptions of the model: segmentation in the quality of education received by children from more and less educated parents. Data from PISA 2000 are used. PISA is an internationally standardized assessment of 15-year-olds, developed by the OECD and UNESCO. The main focus of the assessment in 2000 was in literacy (reading).
14 If the quality of education was set equal for the two sectors at a higher level than the one used for Figure 4 , the j=1 transition function would not intersect the 45° line at low human capital levels, eliminating the two first equilibria
and all dynasties would converge to the high human capital and income equilibrium * H h . In that case, condition (C.5) would not be satisfied. Although this is a possibility in the model, it can be argued that it might be an extremely optimistic point of view on the potential that such a policy could have. PISA dataset was used to analyze whether the assumption of differences in the quality of education received by children from different social sectors is plausible in the case of Argentina. A thorough testing of this hypothesis should estimate multilevel education production functions, analysing the impact of socioeconomic characteristics on the between-schools variance in test scores. This has been done by Cervini (2002 Cervini ( , 2005 using national data, finding empirical support for the idea of social segmentation of the Argentinean educational system. 15 Such an estimation exercise falls beyond the scope of this paper. However, although a basic tool, the hypothesis tests of the difference in means performed here provide some intuition for the assumption.
In the model, ij t h and 1 ij t h + represent, correspondingly, the human capital level of the parent and the child i from social sector j. The social sector is given by the parent's human capital level and income. The case of two social circles, 1 j = and 2 j = , distinguished by being below and above the human capital level ĥ , is analysed. It is hypothesized that ĥ could correspond to tertiary education. The same threshold is assumed for the hypothesis tests done in this empirical exercise. Table 1 presents the results of the hypothesis test for the difference in the mean value of an indicator of children's human capital and different indicators of the quality of education they receive ( j q in the model) for two groups of students: group 1 j = , where parents lack tertiary education (either university or other post-secondary education), and group 2 j = , where parents have tertiary education. The mean values for the whole sample are also included in the table. Given that the model assumes education as being public, the reported results correspond to tests conducted only with students who attend public schools. The total sample is 1,222 students, corresponding to 54 schools, of which 860 students are in group 1 j = , and 362 students in group 2 j = . 16 As expected, the mean value of the International Socioeconomic Index of Occupational Status is significantly higher for the group of children whose parents have tertiary education than for the group whose parents lack similar education (the simplified assumption that income equals human capital is used in the model). 17 Also, measured by PISA's reading score, the average human capital of the children of parents with tertiary education is also significantly higher than the average human capital of those children whose parents lack tertiary education, suggesting the intuitive positive relation between children and parents' human capital assumed in the model. These results are standard and predictable. However, it is interesting to note that among the students attending public schools, there seems to be significant differences in the average quality of education received by children from the more and less advantaged social sectors.
Seven different indicators of the quality of education are used: an index of the quality of the school's educational resources, index of the quality of schools' physical infrastructure, the number of computers per student, index of teachers' behaviour, the teachers-students ratio and the proportion of language teachers who have a third-level qualification. These indicators are constructed by PISA from questionnaires to school principals. 18 PISA contains other indicators of school quality but this exercise does not pretend to be exhaustive. Note, however, that the seven indicators cover aspects of educational, physical and human resources of the schools. 19 Results indicate that for the seven indicators on the quality of education, the mean value of the group of children with more educated parents is significantly higher than that of the group with less educated parents. The index of the teachers' behaviour is the only indicator for which the difference is less significant (only at the 10 per cent level).
The same exercise was performed with the sample split into three groups instead of two: students with primary-educated parents or less, those with at least one parent with some secondary education (at a level of either completed lower or upper secondary school), and students with at least one parent who completed tertiary education. The results of the hypothesis tests of differences in the means between the three groups are similar to those reported in Table 1 . The difference in the mean values of the education quality indicators between the three possible pairs of groups is statistically significant in most cases, suggesting that children coming from better educated households attend better quality schools. 20 Finally, the same exercise was repeated to include government-dependent private schools as well as private schools and in most cases, the difference in the mean values is significant. In summary, in line with previous evidence, PISA data seem to support the assumption of segmentation in the quality of education between social sectors in Argentina, at least among secondary school students.
One possible explanation for the observed differences may be that many public schools in Argentina form private cooperatives to which parents contribute voluntarily to complement funds received from the government. Although this fund usually represents a small percentage of the school budget, schools with children from the more advantaged social sectors will be in a better position to buy additional educational material or improve the infrastructure. Moreover, schools with students coming from the very disadvantaged social sectors cannot count on such extra funds (or they are very meagre). These schools also need to use a large fraction of public funding for purposes other than strictly educational, i.e., satisfying the students' most urgent basic needs such as providing them with daily meals. Clearly, government's allocation of funds should recognize that some schools have very limited possibilities of supplementing the public budget with voluntary funding from parents, and also that these schools usually have to meet other needs of the students, apart from education.
18 The indices of the school's educational resources, the quality of its infrastructure and teacher behaviour are based on the perceptions of the school principals. They are asked about the extent (scale ranging from: not at all, a little, some, a lot) to which 15-year-olds are hindered in their learning by different educational aspects. The issues considered are as follows: for the index of the quality of school's educational resources: lack of instructional material, lack of computers, poor library, poor multi-media resources, poor science equipment and poor facilities for the fine arts; for the index of the quality of school's physical infrastructure: poor condition of buildings, poor heating and cooling and/or lighting systems and lack of instructional space; for the index of teachers' behaviour: low expectations of teachers; poor student-teacher relations; teachers not meeting individual students' needs, teacher absenteeism, staff resisting change, teachers being too strict with students, and students not being encouraged to achieve their full potential. In all cases they range from negative to positive values. For detailed information on how the indices are constructed, see OECD (2002) .
19 Other available indicators include the hours of schooling per year, the proportion of computers with internet access, the proportion of teachers who are certified by the appropriate authority, an index of teacher shortage, an index of teacher morale and commitment, and indices of school and teacher autonomy. The PISA dataset for Argentina has a high number of missing observations. Therefore, the greater the number of indicators used, the smaller the sample with complete data.
20 With regard to the number of computers per student and the percentage of teachers with third-level qualifications, the difference in means is not significant between the group of children with primary-educated parents and those children whose parents have, at a maximum, secondary education. With respect to teacher-behaviour index, the difference in means is not significant between the group of children whose parents have, at a maximum, secondary education, and the group whose parents have tertiary education. Notes: Tertiary education includes university and post-secondary non-university education. Each cell presents the variable's average value for each group, the standard deviation, and the 95% confidence interval. Below, the t-statistic value of the hypothesis test of equal means for j=1 and j=2 groups is presented, its standard deviation and the P-Value. For the hypothesis test it was assumed that the two groups j=1 and j=2 have unknown but equal variances. Hypothesis tests were performed considering the weights provided in the database, which correspond to the Fay's Balance Repeated Replication Weights Methodology. Stata command svy was used for this. Results do not vary if these weights are not used. Source: Own elaboration using PISA 2000 data.
Conclusions
This paper presents a poverty trap model based on Berti Ceroni (2001) , with the important motivation that it incorporates the quality of education. Starting with initial inequality in the distribution of human capital and income, the human capital accumulation dynamics (which respond to optimizing behaviour) lead, under certain conditions, to a situation with three simultaneous steady-state equilibria. For those individuals with an initial, low human capital endowment, it is not profitable to invest in education, and these remain in that situation for ever. Those exceeding a certain human capital threshold will invest in education, but as they receive low-quality education, they remain trapped at low levels of human capital and income. Only the dynasties which initially have high levels of human capital reach the steady state at a high human capital and income level. The existence of poverty traps lowers the economy's current and steady-state aggregate output level as well as the growth rate.
However, the model suggests the possibility to break out of the vicious circle: by equating the quality of education for all social sectors. Such a policy would eliminate the intermediate equilibrium, making it possible for a greater part of the population to converge to the highest levels of human capital and income, producing a higher aggregate steady-state output level and increasing in this way the aggregate social welfare.
The model constitutes only the first step in formalizing the concept that differences in the quality of education may lead to poverty traps. It has some restrictive assumptions, such as the linear production function and non-consideration of physical capital. At the same time, the equilibria configuration analysed here is not the only one possible and depends on the position of the threshold level ĥ which distinguishes the two social sectors. The Appendix details the other possible equilibria configurations. Therefore, it cannot be stated that differences in the quality of education received by children from different social sectors necessarily lead to poverty traps, but they do constitute a possibility. Some basic statistical tools applied to PISA 2000 suggest that the model may be appropriate for the Argentinean case. Moreover, and in line with the World Development Report 2006, the model gives theoretical support not only to policies targeted to guarantee equal access to education but also to equity in the quality of education. , or that they intersect at some point to the right of 2 μ . In any of these cases, because condition C.7 is not satisfied, the first part of condition C.8 will not be satisfied either, so that . In this case, there will be three equilibria at * 2 1 H h < < μ μ . This will be called Scenario 2. In it, all the poor (who start with a human capital level lower than ĥ ), end with a steady-state human capital level equal to 1 μ , that is, they are trapped in a very low poverty trap forever.
On the other hand, the rich (those with a human capital level higher than ĥ ), may converge to two possible steady states, depending on their initial human capital level. If 
